This paper examines how the structure of a social network and the quality of information available to different agents determine the speed of social learning. To this end, we study a variant of the seminal model of DeGroot (1974) , according to which agents linearly combine their personal experiences with the views of their neighbors. We show that the rate of learning has a simple analytical characterization in terms of the relative entropy of agents' signal structures and their eigenvector centralities. Our characterization establishes that the way information is dispersed throughout the social network has non-trivial implications for the rate of learning. In particular, we show that when the informativeness of different agents' signal structures are comparable in the sense of Blackwell (1953) , then a positive assortative matching of signal qualities and eigenvector centralities maximizes the rate of learning. On the other hand, if information structures are such that each individual possesses some information crucial for learning, then the rate of learning is higher when agents with the best signals are located at the periphery of the network. Finally, we show that the extent of asymmetry in the structure of the social network plays a key role in the long-run dynamics of the beliefs.
Introduction
Information regarding many economic or social fundamentals is widely dispersed throughout the society. Whereas in many cases dispersed information can be aggregated through some centralized mechanism or signal (such as prices), there are instances for which such centralized mechanisms may not efficiently aggregate information. This, however, does not mean that information remains diffuse, as individuals may rely on alternative decentralized mechanisms, such as face-to-face communications or social media, for the utilization and aggregation of information.
One recent striking example is the success of the 2011 popular uprising in Egypt, despite the absence of traditional opposition media platforms (such as television or radio stations). It is widely believed that internet-based social media played a key role in disseminating vital information, such as the time and location of the protests as well as detailed accounts of the events unfolding throughout Cairo. In fact, at the peak of the uprising, the Egyptian government took the drastic and unprecedented measure of shutting down the Internet and cell phone networks across the country with the intention of disrupting the main communication channels of the opposition (Ali (2011) ).
Understanding the role of decentralized interactions in the dissemination and aggregation of information is of first-order relevance not only in providing insights on social phenomena such as uprisings, but also from a normative point of view. For example, various development or public health projects in the developing world rely on the power of social networks in disseminating information.
1 Similarly, effective decision-making in modern, complex organizations relies heavily on decentralized information sharing mechanisms among different entities or divisions within the organization. A better understanding of the interplay of individual interactions and information diffusion may thus be crucial in designing effective public policy or organizational structure.
Motivated by these observations, this paper examines how social interactions in the presence of dispersed information determine the long-run dynamics of the beliefs. To this end, we utilize a simple model of opinion formation introduced by Jadbabaie et al. (2012) , which in turn is a variant of the seminal model of DeGroot (1974) . Agents are endowed with a sequence of private signals that are potentially informative about an underlying state of the world. We capture the dispersion and heterogeneity of information by assuming that agents' private observations are drawn from different distributions and that they may be only partially informative about the state. We also assume that individuals cannot observe the beliefs held by all members of the society. Rather, they only have access to the opinions of the agents in their social clique. The key feature of the model is that each agent linearly combines her private observations with the opinions of her neighbors.
We characterize the speed of social learning as a function of the primitives of the environment, namely, the structure of the social network and agents' information structures. We show that the structural features of the network which are relevant for the long-run dynamics of the beliefs are 1 Examples include education programs on deworming (Miguel and Kremer (2003) ) and introduction of biofortified agricultural technologies (McNiven and Gilligan (2011) ).
summarized via its eigenvector centrality, a recursively defined notion of importance of different agents in the network. We also show that the rate of learning depends on the information structure of each agent via the expected log-likelihood ratios of her signal distributions, a quantity known as relative entropy. More specifically, our characterization result establishes that conditional on the realization of a given state, the rate at which agents rule out another state as a possibility is equal to the convex combination of the relative entropies, where the weights are given by the agents' eigenvector centralities.
Our characterization of the rate of learning enables us to analyze how the dispersion of information throughout the network affects the long-run dynamics of the beliefs. We show that if the vectors of pairwise relative entropies of all agents are comparable with respect to the product order -what we refer to as uniform informativeness ordering of signal structures -then, assigning signals of the highest quality to the more central agents increases the speed of social learning. Put differently, the positive assortative matching of signal qualities and eigenvector centralities leads to the fastest convergence of the beliefs to the truth. The intuition behind this result is simple: given that more central individuals receive more effective attention from other agents in the social network, assigning the information structure that is uniformly more informative to the more central agents guarantees that information is diffused faster.
This result is in line with the empirical observations of Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Duflo, and Jackson (2012) , who study how variations in the set of individuals exogenously informed about a microfinance program determine the eventual participation rate. By analyzing the social network and participation data in 43 rural villages in southern India, they find that the long-run rate of participation is higher when the "injection points" have higher eigenvector centralities. Even though based on somewhat different premises, the theoretical implications of our model match Banerjee et al. (2012) 's empirical observations that (i) the network properties and locations of the exogenously informed individuals can substantially impact the diffusion of information; (ii) the extent of diffusion is significantly higher when the information injection points have higher eigenvector centralities; and more generally, (iii) beyond eigenvector centrality, other measures of network connectivity (such as average degree, average path length, clustering, etc.) do not play a substantial role in the long-run dynamics of the beliefs. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to study the role of information heterogeneity and injection points from a theoretical point of view.
We also use our characterization of the rate of learning to analyze the long-run dynamics of the beliefs under conditions that essentially correspond to the polar opposite of uniform informativeness ordering of signal structures. More specifically, we show that if every agent possesses some information that is crucial for learning -in the sense that other agents cannot learn the underlying state without her participation in the network -then the positive assortative matching of signal qualities and eigenvector centralities no longer maximizes the rate of learning. Rather, learning is obtained more rapidly if the least central agents receive signals of the highest quality. The intuition behind this result is as follows: if the information required for distinguishing between the pair of states that are hardest to tell apart is only available to agents that receive very little effective attention from others, then it would take a long time for (i) those agents to collect enough information to distinguish between the two states; and (ii) for this information to be diffused throughout the network. On the other hand, a negative assortative matching of signal qualities and eigenvector centralities guarantees that these two events happen in parallel, leading to a faster convergence rate.
We also provide a comparative analysis of how the structural properties of the social network determine the speed at which agents' beliefs concentrate around the truth. We define a novel partial order over the set of social networks which captures the extent of asymmetry in the network structure. In particular, we define a network to be more regular than another if the eigenvector centrality of the former is majorized by that of the latter. According to this notion, eigenvector centralities in a more regular social network are more evenly distributed among different individuals.
We show that if the agents' signal structures are comparable in the uniform sense, then the rate of learning is decreasing in the social network's regularity. This is a consequence of the fact that, under positive assortative matching of signal qualities and eigenvector centralities, more dispersion in centralities guarantees that higher quality signals receive more effective attention, thus speeding up the learning process. In contrast, if all agents posses some information crucial for learning, then the speed of learning is higher in more regular networks, as in such a scenario an informational bottleneck effect plays a dominant role in determining the long-run dynamics of the beliefs: learning is complete only when the information uniquely available to the most marginal agent is diffused throughout the society.
The juxtaposition of our results suggests that, in general, the exact role played by social interactions in the dynamics of the beliefs does not disentangle from the informational content of such communications. Rather, as our analysis highlights, the long-run dynamics of the beliefs is sensitive to the specifics of how information is dispersed throughout the social network.
Related Literature Our paper belongs to the large body of works that study learning over social networks. One of the main strands of this literature focuses on simple, non-Bayesian rule-of-thumb updating processes. These works, for the most part, rely on the well-known opinion formation model of DeGroot (1974) , according to which, agents update their beliefs as the average of their neighbors' opinions. DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003) , Acemoglu, Ozdaglar, and ParandehGheibi (2010) , and Jackson (2010, 2012a,b) are among the papers that use DeGroot's model to study opinion dynamics. Golub and Jackson (2010) , for example, provide conditions on the structures of a growing sequence of social networks under which asymptotic opinions of all agents converge to the truth. The DeGroot model is generalized by Jadbabaie et al. (2012) to allow for constant arrival of new information over time. We utilize this latter model to study the speed of social learning in the presence of information heterogeneity.
The paper most closely related to ours is the recent work of Golub and Jackson (2012b) , who study the speed of convergence of the benchmark DeGroot learning model. However, the two papers focus on different questions. Whereas Golub and Jackson study the role of homophily -the tendency of agents to associate disproportionately with those having similar traits -in belief dynamics, the focus of our analysis is to understand how the distribution of information over the social network affects the rate at which agents learn the truth. Furthermore, unlike the benchmark DeGroot model, we explicitly model agents' signal structures and analyze the role of information heterogeneity in their long-run beliefs.
In addition to the DeGroot learning models, there is a growing literature that studies Bayesian learning over social networks. Examples include, Gale and Kariv (2003) , Rosenberg, Solan, and Vieille (2009 ), Acemoglu, Dahleh, Lobel, and Ozdaglar (2011 ), Lobel and Sadler (2012 , MuellerFrank (2013) and Acemoglu, Bimpikis, and Ozdaglar (forthcoming) . Due to the extreme complexity of Bayesian updating over social networks, this literature mainly focuses on the question of convergence of beliefs to the truth and is largely silent on the transient learning dynamics. We, on the other hand, are able to analytically characterize the speed of learning as a function of the agents' information structure and the structural properties of the social network, and hence, perform comparative analyses.
Our paper is also related to the smaller and much more recent collection of empirical studies that focus on learning and the diffusion of information over social networks. As already mentioned, Banerjee et al. (2012) study the diffusion of a microfinance program in rural India and find that the eventual participation rate depends on the eigenvector centrality of the information injection points. Chandrasekhar, Larreguy, and Xandri (2011) conduct a unique lab experiment to test several models of learning over social networks. They observe that the evolution of choices made by the subjects are better explained by a variant of the DeGroot model rather than Bayesian learning models. Among other related empirical studies of learning and information aggregation in social networks are Kariv (2005, 2012) , Alatas, Banerjee, Chandrasekhar, Hanna, and Olken (2012), and Corazzini, Pavesi, Petrovich, and Stanca (2012) .
Finally, our paper is related to the literatures in decision theory and information economics that provide foundations for the concept of relative entropy, such as Sandroni (2000), Blume and Easley (2006) , Lehrer and Smorodinsky (2000) , and Cabrales, Gossner, and Serrano (2012) . None of these papers, however, study the role of relative entropy in the context of learning over social networks.
Outline of the Paper The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section contains the model. Our characterization of the rate of learning is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we show how the spread of information throughout the social network affects the speed of learning. The comparative analysis of the role of the social network topology in the long-run dynamics of the beliefs is provided in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. All proofs and some additional results are provided in the Appendix.
Model

Agents and Observations
Consider a collection of n individuals, denoted by N = {1, 2 . . . , n}, who are attempting to learn an underlying state of the world θ ∈ Θ. The underlying state is drawn at t = 0 according to probability distribution ν ∈ ∆Θ with full support over Θ, which we assume to be finite.
Even though the realized state of the world remains unobservable to the individuals, they make repeated noisy observations about θ over discrete time. In particular, at each time period t ∈ N and conditional on the realization of state θ, agent i observes a private signal ω it ∈ S which is drawn according to distribution θ i (·) ∈ ∆S.
2 We assume that the signal space S is finite and that θ i (·) has full support over S for all i and all θ ∈ Θ. The realized signals are independent across individuals and over time. We refer to the collection of conditional probability distributions { θ i (·)} θ∈Θ as the signal structure of agent i and for simplicity denote it by i . An individual's observations may not be informative about the underlying state. Rather, each agent may face an identification problem in the sense that she may not be able to distinguish between two states. However, we impose the following assumption on the agents' signal structures. Assumption 1. For any distinct pair of states θ,θ ∈ Θ, there exists an agent i such that
The above assumption guarantees that even though each agent may face an identification problem in isolation, there is no global identification problem: agents' observations are informative enough to allow them to collectively learn the underlying state.
Let ω t = (ω 1t , . . . , ω nt ) denote the signal profile realized at time t and denote the set of infinite signal profile sequences by Ω = {ω : ω = (ω 1 , ω 2 , . . . )}. Conditional on the realization of state θ, sample paths ω ∈ Ω are realized according to the probability distribution
where N denotes the set of natural numbers. We use P to denote the probability distribution over Θ× Ω defined as P(θ, ·) = ν(θ)P θ (·). The expectation operators with respect to probability distributions P θ and P are denoted by E θ and E, respectively.
Learning Rule
At every time period, in addition to her private observation, each agent also has access to the beliefs of a subset of other agents, which we refer to as her neighbors. Agents apply a simple learning rule similar to the learning model of DeGroot (1974) to incorporate their private signals and the views of their neighbors. In particular, at every time period, each agent updates her belief as a convex combination of (i) the Bayesian posterior belief conditioned on her private signal; and (ii) the opinions of her neighbors. More precisely, if µ it (·) ∈ ∆Θ denotes the belief of agent i at time period t, then
where BU(µ it ; ω it+1 ) is the Bayesian update of agent i's opinion at time period t following the observation of the private signal ω it+1 , and {a ij } is a collection of non-negative constants such that a ii > 0 for all i and a ij > 0 if and only if j = i is a neighbor of i. Thus, the value of a ij captures the weight that agent i assigns to the belief of agent j. For simplicity of exposition, we assume that a ii = α for all i. By construction, individuals cannot directly incorporate the views of agents with whom they are not neighbors. Finally, note that for µ it+1 to be a well-defined probability distribution over Θ, the weights that each agent i assigns to her Bayesian posterior belief and the beliefs of her neighbors must add up to one, that is, n j=1 a ij = 1.
Social Network
The extent of social interactions can be summarized by the matrix A = [a ij ], which we refer to as the social interaction matrix. Equivalently, one can capture the social interactions between the agents by a directed, weighted graph on n vertices. Each vertex of this graph, which we refer to as the social network, corresponds to an agent and a directed edge (j, i) with weight a ij > 0 is present from vertex j to vertex i if agent j is a neighbor of agent i. Thus, the social interaction matrix A is the (weighted) adjacency matrix of the underlying social network. Given this equivalence, we use the two concepts interchangeably.
A directed path in the social network from vertex i to vertex j is a sequence of vertices starting with i and ending with j such that each vertex is a neighbor of the next vertex in the sequence. We say the social network is strongly connected if there exists a directed path from each vertex to any other.
Assumption 2. The underlying social network is strongly connected.
The above assumption simply guarantees that information can flow from any agent in the network to any other. Expressed in terms of the social interaction matrix, Assumption 2 is equivalent to assuming that A is irreducible. In fact, if no individual receives any informative signals beyond time period t = 1, learning rule
(1) reduces to the DeGroot update. In this sense, our model is a natural generalization of the DeGroot learning models to the case that agents make repeated observations over time. This feature of the model is key for our results as it enables us to introduce information heterogeneity in a simple manner, and hence, study the role that different agents' signal structures play in the extent of information aggregation.
The model exhibits a number of other desirable features which make it suitable for the study of information aggregation over social networks. First, the evolution of the individuals' beliefs asymptotically coincides with those of Bayesian agents. Note that as in the benchmark DeGroot model, agents do not adjust the updating rule to account for the network structure and the differences in the precision of information that other agents may have learned over time. Nevertheless, the next result, which is proved in Jadbabaie et al. (2012) , shows that the dispersed information in the social network is successfully aggregated.
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then,
for all i, where 1 θ (·) is the degenerate probability measure that assigns a unit mass on the underlying state θ.
Thus, the resulting learning process asymptotically coincides with Bayesian learning despite the fact that agents use a DeGroot-style update to incorporate the views of their neighbors. More specifically, each agent eventually learns the true underlying state of the world as if she were aware of the observations of all agents and updated her beliefs according to Bayes' rule.
Another feature of the model is its simplicity, which enables us to analytically characterize the asymptotic behavior of the agents' beliefs. In particular, unlike the Bayesian learning models -in which each agent needs to form and update beliefs about the observations made by all other agents while only observing the beliefs (or actions) of her neighbors -our model is tractable. Yet, as we show in the following sections, the model is rich enough to capture the non-trivial interplay between the informativeness of agents' private signal structures and the structure of the social network on the one hand and the extent and speed of learning on the other.
Finally, we remark that recent empirical evidence suggests that, in certain contexts, DeGroot-like rule-of-thumb learning models do a good job in explaining individuals' learning processes. More specifically, in a series of experiments conducted in rural India, Chandrasekhar et al. (2011) test several models of learning over social networks. They follow the evolution of choices made by subjects who repeatedly observe the actions of their neighbors. Their findings suggest that the observed paths of learning are better explained by a variant of the DeGroot model rather than Bayesian learning models.
Rate of Social Learning
In this section, we characterize the rate at which agents learn the underlying state as a function of the structure of the social network and the agents' signal structures. Before presenting the results,
we define a few key concepts.
Relative Entropy
Given their heterogeneous signal structures, different individuals may have access to different information about the underlying state of the world. For example, some agents may receive more informative signals conditional on the realization of a specific state. Furthermore, the signal structure of each given individual may not be equally informative about all states, in the sense that the collection of her private signals may provide her with more information about a given state than another. To measure the extent of such heterogeneity, we borrow the concept of relative entropy, first introduced by Kullback and Leibler (1951) , from the information theory literature.
Definition 1. Given two discrete probability distributions p and q with identical supports, the relative entropy of q with respect to p is
where p j and q j are the probabilities of the realization of the jth outcome.
One can verify that D(p q) ≥ 0 for all pairs of distributions p and q and that D(p q) = 0 if and only if p = q. In this sense, relative entropy is a non-symmetric measure of the discrepancy between the two probability distributions. Alternatively, the relative entropy of q with respect to p is the expected value of the log-likelihood ratio test when p and q correspond to the null and alternative hypotheses distributions, respectively.
4
The information content of agent i's signal structure can be measured in terms of the relative entropies of her marginal signal distributions. For any pair of states θ,θ ∈ Θ, let
Thus, h i (θ,θ) is a measure of the expected information (per observation) in agent i's signal structure in favor of the hypothesis that the underlying state is θ against the alternative hypothesisθ, when the underlying state is indeed θ. When h i (θ,θ) is strictly positive, observing a sufficiently large sequence of signals generated by θ i enables the agent to rule outθ with an arbitrarily large confidence. In particular, the number of observations required to reach a given pre-specified confidence is determined by the magnitude of h i (θ,θ): a larger h i (θ,θ) means that the agent can rule outθ with fewer observations generated by her signal structure. On the other hand, if h i (θ,θ) = 0, then agent i would not be able to distinguish between the states based on her private signals alone, no matter how many observations she makes. In view of the above discussion, we define the following novel partial order over the set of signal structures:
, if the corresponding relative entropies satisfy
In other words, if i i , then i is more discriminating between any pairs of states than i , and as a result, signals generated according to the former provide more information to agent i than the ones generated according to the latter. This notion of informativeness is weaker than Blackwell (1953)'s well-known criterion, according to which a signal structure is more informative than another if any decision-maker prefers the former to the latter in all decision problems. Hence, if i is more informative than i in the sense of Blackwell, then i i , but not vice versa. 5 Finally, we remark that similar to Blackwell's ordering, uniform informativeness is a partial order on the signal structures, as not all signal structures are comparable in the sense of uniform informativeness.
Eigenvector Centrality
In addition to the individuals' signal structures, the detailed structure of the social network also plays a key role in the extent and speed of information aggregation. The following notion is a measure of the importance of different agents in the sense of information flow.
Definition 3. Given the matrix of social interactions A, the eigenvector centrality is a non-negative vector v such that for all i,
and v 1 = 1. The ith element of v is the eigenvector centrality of agent i.
The eigenvector centrality of agent i is thus a measure of her importance defined, recursively, as a function of the importance of the agents who are connected to her: an agent is more central if other more central agents put a large weight on her opinion. The Perron-Frobenius theorem guarantees that if the underlying social network is strongly connected, then the eigenvector centrality is a well-defined notion and is uniquely determined. Furthermore, v i > 0 for all i. 
Speed of Learning
In the remainder of this section, we provide an analytical characterization of the speed of learning over the social network. As implied by Proposition 1, minimal connectivity and identifiability conditions are sufficient to ensure that agents learn the realized state asymptotically. However, after making any finite number of observations, agents remain uncertain about the underlying state of the world. The extent of this uncertainty at a given time period t can be measured via
The above expression is the total variation distance between agents' beliefs at time t and the probability distribution that assigns a unit mass on the realized state of the world. 7 Thus, learning the underlying state implies that e t converges to zero as t → ∞. We define the rate of learning as
The above quantity is inversely proportional to the number of time periods it takes for the agents' uncertainty about the underlying state of the world to fall below some given threshold. In this sense, a higher value of λ implies that agents reach any given level of certainty about the state within a shorter time interval. The next proposition characterizes the rate of learning in terms of the primitives of the environment. 
and v i is the eigenvector centrality of agent i.
Part (a) of the above proposition establishes that agents learn the underlying state of the world (asymptotically) exponentially fast. In particular, the fact that λ ∈ (0, ∞) means that, for large enough values of t, uncertainty e t is proportional to exp(−λt). The significance of Proposition 2, however, lies in establishing that the rate of learning depends not only on the total amount of information available throughout the network, but also on how that information is distributed among different agents. In particular, part (b) provides an upper bound on the rate of learning in terms of the relative entropies of agents' signal structures and their eigenvector centralities. Part (c) then
shows that this upper bound is an arbitrarily good approximation to the rate of learning when the
is close enough to 1 for all pairs of states, all signals s i , and all agents. That is, the upper bound in (4) is arbitrarily tight when the information endowment of agents are small in the sense that no single private signal is very informative about the underlying state. In view of this result, throughout the rest of the paper, we use r as a proxy for the rate of learning.
Expression (4) for the rate of learning has an intuitive interpretation. Recall that relative entropy h i (θ,θ) is the expected rate at which agent i accumulates evidence in favor of θ againstθ when the realized state is indeed θ. Thus, it is not surprising that, ceteris paribus, an increase in the informativeness of the agents' signals (in the uniform sense) cannot lead to a slower rate of learning. In fact, we have the following straightforward corollary to Proposition 2.
Corollary 1. Suppose that i
i for all agents i. Then, for any given social network, the rate of learning with signal structures ( 1 , . . . , n ) is no smaller than with signal structures ( 1 , . . . , n ).
In addition to the signal structures, the rate of learning also depends on the structure of the social network. In particular, the relative entropy between distributions θ i (·) and θ i (·) is weighed by agent i's eigenvector centrality, which measures the effective attention she receives from other agents in the social network. This characterization implies that in the presence of dispersed information, the process of learning exhibits a network bottleneck effect: the long-run dynamics of the beliefs is less sensitive to changes in the information of agents located at the periphery of the network. On a broader level, this observation highlights the fact that even when the total amount of information available throughout the network is kept constant, the way this information is dispersed among different individuals may play a key role in determining the rate of social learning.
Another key observation is that learning is complete only if agents can rule out all incorrect states. More specifically, conditional on the realization of θ ∈ Θ, the speed of learning depends on the rate at which agents rule out the stateθ = θ that is closest to θ in terms of relative entropy.
Furthermore, the realization of the state itself affects the rate, as some states are easier to learn than others. Thus, as (4) suggests, the rate of learning is determined by minimizing the weighted sum of relative entropies over both the realized state θ and all other possible alternativesθ = θ. This characterization points towards the presence of a second bottleneck effect in the learning process, which we refer to as the identification bottleneck: the (ex ante) rate of learning is determined by the pair of states (θ,θ) that are hardest to distinguish from one another.
We end this discussion with a few remarks. First, note that, by definition, the rate of learning λ defined in (3) characterizes the agents' uncertainty about the underlying state asymptotically and does not capture the short-term, transient dynamics of the beliefs. Thus, even though the structural properties of the social network other than its eigenvector centrality do not appear in the expression for the rate of learning, they play a role in how beliefs evolve in the short-term. Finally, we remark that the rate of learning λ is in fact (the absolute value of) the top Lyapunov exponent of the dynamical system that describes the evolution of the agents' beliefs. Given that the top Lyapunov exponent of a dynamical system characterizes the rate of separation of infinitesimally close trajectories, it is not surprising that this quantity coincides with the rate of learning λ.
Information Allocation and Learning
Proposition 2 characterizes the long-run dynamics of the beliefs in terms of the structural properties of the social network and the informativeness of each agent's observations. In this section, we study how the interplay between these two components may lead to non-trivial implications for the rate of social learning.
In view of Corollary 1, the rate of learning increases as agents receive more informative signals.
Therefore, in order to capture the effect of dispersed information on the rate of learning in a meaningful way, we normalize the informativeness of the signal structures by keeping the total amount of information at the network level fixed.
Definition 4. The collection of signal structures ( 1 , . . . , n ) is a reallocation of ( 1 , . . . , n ) if there exists a permutation σ : N → N such that i = σ(i) for all i.
Thus, if ( 1 , . . . , n ) is a reallocation of ( 1 , . . . , n ), then the total amount of information available throughout the society is identical under the two information structures, even though the information available to any given individual may be different.
Learning Under Uniform Informativeness Ordering
We start our analysis by focusing on environments in which different agents' signal structures are comparable in the sense of uniform informativeness; that is, the collection of signal structures ( 1 , . . . , n ) are such that for any pair of agents i and j, either i j or j i . Recall that by Definition 2, a signal structure is uniformly more informative than another, if the former is more discriminating between any pair of states than the latter. Thus, when the agents' signal structures are comparable, then there is an ordering of the individuals such that agents who are ranked higher can distinguish between the underlying state θ and any other alternativeθ with fewer observations, regardless of the value of θ.
Even though the notion of uniform informativeness only provides a partial ordering over the set of all signal structures, there are many real-world scenarios in which the quality of exogenous information available to different agents can be unambiguously ranked in a natural way. For instance, in various marketing or public health campaigns only a subset of agents are exogenously informed (say, about a new product or the benefits of deworming). The rest of the individuals, on the other hand, do not have access to any exogenous sources of information. Rather, they can only obtain information via their interactions with one another or the exogenously informed agents. In such scenarios, the assumption of comparability of signal structures in the sense of uniform informativeness is naturally satisfied. Thus, if the agents' signal structures can be ordered, the rate of learning is highest when the effective attention individuals receive from others is non-decreasing in the informativeness of their signals. In this sense, the positive assortative matching of signals and eigenvector centralities maximizes the rate of learning. The intuition behind this result is that if an information structure is uniformly more informative than another, then by definition, it requires fewer number of observations to distinguish between any pair of states. As a result, allocating such an information structure to a more central agent guarantees that, irrespective of the underlying state, the high quality information receives a higher effective attention from the rest of individuals in the network.
The above result is in line with the empirical observations of Banerjee et al. (2012) who study how participation in a microfinance program diffuses through social networks. By focusing on the participation data from 43 villages in South India, Banerjee et al. (2012) find that the long-run rate of microfinance participation is higher when the "injection points" -that is, individuals who were exogenously informed about the program -have higher eigenvector centralities in the social network. Proposition 3 shows a similar result for our model: if the information available to the agents can be ordered in the sense of uniform informativeness (as is indeed the case if agents are either informed about the program or not), then the speed of learning is maximized when agents with the highest eigenvector centralities are chosen as injection points. Finally, we remark that, as in the observations made by Banerjee et al. (2012) , our result suggests that except for eigenvector centrality, other measures of network connectivity (such as average degree, average path length, clustering, etc.) do not play a role in the long-run dynamics of the beliefs.
Experts and Learning Bottlenecks
Proposition 3 shows that as long as all signal structures are pairwise comparable in the uniform sense, positive assortative matching of signal qualities and eigenvector centralities maximizes the rate of social learning. However, given that uniform informativeness is a partial order over the set of all signal structures, there are many scenarios in which the conditions of Proposition 3 are not satisfied. In particular, if say, agent i is better than agent j in distinguishing between a pair of states (measured in terms of relative entropy) but is worse in distinguishing between another, then signal structures i and j are not comparable in the sense of Definition 2. In this subsection, we study how in the presence of such "experts" -i.e., agents who are particularly well-informed about a subset of states but not necessarily about others -the allocation of signal structures over the social network determines the rate of learning. Before presenting our general result, however, it is constructive to focus on a specific example. Example 1. Consider a social network consisting of n agents and suppose that the set of states and observations are Θ = {θ 0 , θ 1 , . . . , θ n } and S = {Head, Tail}, respectively. Furthermore, suppose that agents' signal structures are given by
where π i > 1/2. Thus, the signal structure of agent i enables her to distinguish θ i from any other state θ = θ i , whereas the rest of the states are observationally equivalent from her perspective.
Given that θ 0 is observationally equivalent to θ i from the point of view of all agents j = i, agent i is effectively the "expert" in learning θ i . Furthermore, it is easy to see that the ability of agent i to distinguish θ i from other states is increasing in π i . In fact, the relative entropy corresponding to agent i's signal structure is
where H i = (2π i −1) log π i −log(1−π i ) is an increasing function of π i . Given that H i is the expected rate at which agent i accumulates evidence in favor of θ i against any other state θ = θ i , it essentially captures the level of "expertise" of agent i: a higher value of H i (or equivalently, π i ) means a greater discrepancy between θi i (·) and other distributions in i's signal structure. Given (6), the rate of learning is equal to
where v is the eigenvector centrality. In view of the above equality, one can verify that among all possible allocations of signal structures to agents, the negative assortative matching of agents' expertise and eigenvector centralities maximizes the rate of learning; that is, speed of learning is maximized if H i ≥ H j whenever v i ≤ v j for all pairs of agents i and j. On the other hand, the positive assortative matching of the two leads to the slowest rate of learning.
Example 1 shows that if all agents are experts -in the sense that information structures are such that each individual possesses information crucial for learning -then, the negative assortative matching of expertise and eigenvector centralities leads to the fastest rate of learning among all possible allocations of signal structures. Put differently, it is best if the least central agents receive signals of the highest quality (π i closer to 1).
The intuition behind this observation is as follows. Recall from the discussion following Proposition 2 that the process of learning exhibits two distinct bottlenecks, namely, the network and the identification bottleneck effects. Due to the network bottleneck effect, the information available to the peripheral agents receives less attention from other individuals. On the other hand, the identification bottleneck effect means that the asymptotic rate of learning is determined by state pairs that are the hardest to distinguish from one another. As a result, if the information structures are such that each individual possesses some information that is crucial for learning, positive assortative matching of signal qualities and eigenvector centralities minimizes the speed of learning. In such a scenario, the two bottleneck effects reinforce one another: the information required for distinguishing the pair of states that are hardest to tell apart is only available to agents that receive very little effective attention from others. As a result, learning the underlying state would take a long time. More concretely, in Example 1, the speed of learning under a positive assortative matching is equal to αv min H min ; the smallest value r = α min i v i H i can obtain. On the contrary, the speed of learning is maximized under the negative assortative matching of signal qualities and eigenvector centralities, as such an allocation would guarantee that the two bottlenecks are as far away from one another as possible.
We remark that in the discussions following Proposition 3 and Example 1, we used terms such as "higher quality signals" and "better information" somewhat loosely. Whereas in the former case, such terms are used to refer to a signal structure that is more informative in the uniform sense, in the context of Example 1 similar terms are used to refer to the signal structure of an agent with a higher expertise about a state. Nevertheless, we emphasize that despite this apparent inconsistency, these two cases can indeed be unified in a consistent manner using a weaker notion of information ordering. In particular, we say a signal structure is weakly more informative than another, if it is uniformly more informative under some permutation of the states. 9 This definition immediately implies that in the context of Example 1, the signal structure of agent i is (weakly) more informative than agent j's if and only if H i ≥ H j . Thus, in both cases, a signal of higher quality provides more information about the state and leads to a faster reduction of uncertainty.
We now proceed to show that the insights obtained from Example 1 remain valid in more general settings. Given the (ordered) pair of states (θ,θ), let
capture the extent to which the signal structure of agent i is more informative in distinguishing θ fromθ relative to other agents'. Thus, γ i (θ,θ) ≥ 1 means that no other agent can rule outθ when the underlying state is θ with fewer observations (in expectation) than agent i. Furthermore, let
be the set of state pairs which agent i can tell apart better than any other agent. 10 Finally, we define the following notions of expertise:
9 Formally, i w j if there exists a permutation σ : Θ → Θ such that i j where
(·) for all θ. 10 Given that relative entropy is a non-symmetric measure of discrepancy between two distributions, it may be the case that (θ, θ) ∈ Ei, even though (θ,θ) ∈ Ei.
Definition 5.
Provided that E i = ∅, the relative and absolute expertise of agent i are, respectively,
We have the following result. Thus, if for any agent i, there exists a pair of states (θ,θ) for which she can accumulate evidence in favor of one versus the other at a higher rate than all other agents, then negative assortative matching of absolute levels of expertise and eigenvector centralities leads to rapid learning. In particular, no reallocation of signal structures can increase the rate of learning by more than α max i ε i / min i γ i .
Note that this constant is inversely proportional to min i γ i . Therefore, ceteris paribus, increasing the relative expertise of all agents leads to a smaller upper bound. In fact, this upper bound can be arbitrarily small if agents' signal structures are such that their relative expertise are large enough.
Network Regularity and Learning
Our analysis thus far was focused on how the rate of learning changes with the reallocation of information among agents, while keeping the structure of the social network fixed. In this section, we provide a comparative analysis of how the structural properties of the social network determine the speed at which agents' beliefs concentrate around the truth.
We start by defining a partial order over the set of social networks. As before, let v denote the eigenvector centrality corresponding to the social interaction matrix (equivalently, social network) A.
Definition 6. Social network A is more regular than
∀k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
where
is the i-th largest element of vector x.
11
Intuitively, a social network is more regular if the effective attention that different agents receive from the rest of the society is more evenly distributed. In particular, as (7) suggests, increasing the centralities of more central agents at the expense of more marginal ones would lead to a less regular social network. The following simple example illustrates how the notion of regularity defined above captures the extent of asymmetry in the structure of the social network.
11 Equivalently, A is more regular than A if the probability distribution corresponding to probability mass function v ↓ first-order stochastically dominates the probability distribution corresponding to v ↓ , where x ↓ denotes the vector with the same components of x sorted in the non-increasing order.
Example 2. Consider the ring social network, depicted in Figure 1(a) . Each agent i updates her belief as a function of her private observations and the opinion of a single other agent, namely agent i − 1. Due to the full symmetry in the network structure, it is immediate that all agents have equal eigenvector centralities, that is, v i = 1/n for all i. Thus, no other social network is (strictly) more regular than the ring.
12 There are, however, other social networks that are as regular as the ring network. In particular, any social network for which the sum of the weights assigned to the opinion of each agent is equal across the society -that is, j =i a ji is equal for all i -is as regular as the ring network. the network relative to all other agents. Such an asymmetry is also reflected in the agents' eigenvector centralities. In particular, v 1 = 1/2, whereas v i = 1/(2n − 2) for i = 1. One can verify that for the eigenvector centrality v corresponding to any other social network,
for all k. Thus, the highly asymmetric star network is indeed the least regular social network.
We end this discussion by contrasting our notion of regularity with an alternative notion of symmetry introduced by Acemoglu et al. (2012) , who measure the symmetry of the network topology in terms of the standard deviation of the agents' centralities. Even though both notions capture the dispersion in the agents' centralities, the two are not identical. In particular, as we show in Appendix B, if a network is more regular than another, then it is also more symmetric as defined by Acemoglu et al. (2012) . The converse, however, is not true as regularity only defines a partial order over the set 12 This is a consequence of the fact that
≥ k/n for any stochastic vector v . 13 In the graph theory literature, such a network is simply referred to as a regular graph. Note that, by construction, j =i aji = 1 − α in any regular network. of social networks. Finally, we remark that, under both notions, the ring and star networks correspond to the most and least symmetric network structures, respectively.
We now present the main result of this section. For a given social network and a collection of signal structures, let r * denote the fastest rate of learning that can be obtained via reallocation of signals.
Proposition 5.
Suppose that A is more regular than A and that i = i for all i. Also suppose that the collection of signal structures ( 1 , . . . , n ) are comparable in the sense of uniform informativeness.
Then, r * ≤ r * .
Thus, if the agents' signal structures can be ordered in the sense of uniform informativeness, the rate of learning under the optimal allocation of signals is decreasing in the regularity of the social network. The intuition behind the above result is simple: with uniform informativeness ordering of signal structures and under positive assortative matching of agents' centralities and signal qualities, a higher level of dispersion in centralities guarantees that higher quality signals receive more effective attention, thus speeding up the learning process. Proposition 5 also implies that the ring and star social networks correspond to the smallest and largest rates of learning, respectively. The next example shows that in large societies, the difference in the performance of the two social networks can be arbitrarily large.
Example 2 (continued).
Consider the ring and star social networks depicted in Figures 1(a) and 1(b), respectively. Also suppose that the private observations are such that m ≤ n agents have access to identical signal structures that are informative about the underlying state of the world, whereas the remaining n−m individuals do not observe any informative signals. In other words, for any given i, either h i (θ,θ) =h(θ,θ) > 0 for all distinct pairs (θ,θ), or h i (θ,θ) = 0 for all (θ,θ). Clearly, the signal structures can be ordered in the uniform sense. Proposition 5 thus implies that the (maximum) speed of learning in the star network is higher than in the ring social network. Furthermore, simple algebraic derivations imply that as n → ∞,
Thus, if the number of informed agents m does not grow at the same rate as the network size n, learning in the ring and star networks occurs at diverging rates.
Proposition 5 establishes that if the signal structures are pairwise comparable in the uniform sense, then rate of learning is decreasing in the social network's regularity. Furthermore, the above example shows that in large networks, the role played by the structural properties of the networks can be significant. In view of the discussion in Section 4.2, however, one would expect that similar results would no longer hold in the presence of expert agents. The following simple example shows that this is indeed the case.
Example 3. Consider the collection of signal structures given in (5) and assume that π i = π for all i.
Thus, each agent i is the expert in learning state θ i . As we showed in Example 1, the rate of learning is simply equal to r = αv min H. This immediately implies that if social network A is more regular than A , then r ≥ r , regardless of the allocation of the signal structures.
Thus, in stark contrast to the case in which signal structures are comparable in the uniform sense, more regularity in the social network implies a larger rate of convergence. This is due to the fact that when all agents are experts, the information bottleneck effect plays a dominant role in determining the long-run dynamics of the beliefs: learning is complete only when the information uniquely available to the most marginal agent is diffused throughout the society. It is thus the centrality of the least central agent that determines the rate of information diffusion, and as a result, a more regular structure guarantees a faster convergence.
Despite this observation, our next result establishes that in the presence of experts, the rate of learning in large societies does not vary significantly as a function of the network structure. Contrasting it with (8), the result also highlights yet another way in which the long-run dynamics of the beliefs crucially depend on the way information is dispersed throughout the network.
Proposition 6. Consider a sequence of information structures ( 1,n , . . . , n,n ) parametrized by the number of agents n. Also suppose that (a) E i,n = ∅ for all i and all n. Then, for any two sequences of social networks A n and A n and any allocation of signal structures,
Thus, in the presence of expert agents, the rate of learning is essentially of the same order for all network structures and signal allocations. Such a result is due to the fact that when all agents are experts, the information content in all agents' private signals are equally important for learning. Hence, regardless of the structure of the social network or the allocation of the signals, the rate of learning depends on the eigenvector centrality of the most marginal agent, which is always of order 1/n. We remark that the assumptions required for the above proposition to hold are fairly weak. Assumption (a) simply means that all agents are experts, whereas (b) requires that the absolute expertise of the agents do not diverge from one another. Finally, (c) is a technical assumption guaranteeing that the relative expertise of the agents are large enough.
Conclusions
This paper studies how social interactions in the presence of dispersed information shape opinion dynamics. We focus on a tractable DeGroot-style model of opinion formation and study the rate of learning as a proxy for the long-run dynamics of the beliefs. Despite its simplicity, the model is rich enough to provide sharp insights on the roles of information heterogeneity and social interactions in learning.
We characterize the rate of learning in terms of the relative entropy of different agents' signal structures and their eigenvector centralities. We show that if agents' signal structures are comparable in the sense of uniform informativeness, then the rate of learning is maximized when the most central agents receive signals of the highest quality. Our analytical result is thus in line with the recent empirical observations that the eigenvector centrality of information injection points plays a key role in determining the extent and speed of information diffusion. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to provide a theoretical study of the role of information injection points in the dynamics of the beliefs.
We also show that in the presence of experts -i.e., agents with access to information crucial for learning -the role played by the social network structure is inverted. In particular, learning is slower if the high quality signals are assigned to the more central agents rather than the ones at the periphery of the network. This result is a consequence of the fact that learning is slowed down whenever the information and identification bottleneck effects reinforce one another. More specifically, if the information required for distinguishing the pair of states that are hardest to tell apart is only available to an agent who receives very little effective attention from others, then it would take a long time for (i) that agent to collect enough information to distinguish between the two states; and (ii) for this information to be diffused throughout the network. On the other hand, a negative assortative matching of signal qualities and eigenvector centralities guarantees that these two events happen in parallel, leading to a faster convergence rate.
Finally, by defining the novel notion of regularity as a measure of the extent of asymmetry in the network structure, we provide a comparative analysis of the role of the structural properties of the social network on the long-run dynamics of the beliefs. We show that even though the speed of learning is smaller in more regular networks when the signal structures are comparable in the uniform sense, the exact opposite is true when each agent possesses some information crucial for learning.
On a broader level, our characterization results highlight that the distribution of information may play a key role in the extent and speed of information diffusion in social networks. Such an observation suggests that incorporating information heterogeneity explicitly into the theoretical and empirical studies of social interactions can enhance our understanding of different phenomena that entail information transmission and diffusion, such as social mobilization, viral marketing, or public health campaigns. Blackwell (1953) defines a decision-theoretic notion of what it means for a signal structure to be more informative than another. According to this notion, a signal structure is more informative than another if a decision-maker with any utility function would prefer to use the former over the latter when facing any decision problem.
Appendix
A Blackwell's Ordering and Uniform Informativeness
It is well-known that Blackwell's requirement for the ordering of signal structures is very strong and that most signal structure pairs are not comparable in the sense of Blackwell. One can define a related and weaker notion of informativeness (Jewitt (2007) ): an information structure is said to be
Blackwell more informative than another on dichotomies if the former is Blackwell more informative than the latter on all dichotomous subsets {θ,θ} ⊂ Θ.
The next result shows that our notion of uniform informativeness defined in Section 3 provides a more complete order over the set of signal structures than either of the notions above.
Proposition 7. Suppose that is Blackwell more informative than on dichotomies. Then, is uniformly more informative than .
Proof. By the theorem of Blackwell and Girshick (1954, p.328) , is Blackwell more informative than on dichotomies, if and only if
for all θ,θ ∈ Θ and all convex functions φ. Given that φ(x) = − log(x) is convex, this immediately guarantees that informativeness in the sense of Blackwell (on dichotomies) implies informativeness in the uniform sense.
Notice that the above proof also establishes that the inverse of Proposition 7 does not hold in general. In particular, for a signal structure to be more informative than another on dichotomies in the sense of Blackwell, inequality (9) should hold for all convex functions φ, whereas for uniform informativeness, it is sufficient that (9) is satisfied for φ(x) = log(x). Thus, unlike most other information orders (such as Lehmann (1988) 's), uniform informativeness does not coincide with
Blackwell's order on dichotomies. Acemoglu et al. (2012) define a measure of symmetry of network structures according to which network A is more symmetric than network A if v 2 ≤ v 2 , where v and v are the centrality vectors corresponding to A and A , respectively. The next result relates this notion to the notion of regularity defined in Section 5.
B Regularity and Network Symmetry
Proposition 8. If social network A is more regular than
Before presenting the proof, we state and prove a simple lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose that vector y majorizes vector y as defined in (7). Then, for any non-negative
Proof. By assumption,
for all k ≤ n. Multiplying both sides of the above inequality by the non-negative number
and summing over all k imply n k=1
with the convention that
completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 8
Given that A is more regular than A , the eigenvector centrality v is majorized by v . Thus, by Lemma 1,
Applying Lemma 1 once again implies
Combining the above two inequalities completes the proof.
C Proofs Proof of Proposition 2
We first provide a proof for statement (b) of the proposition. We then proceed to prove parts (a) and (c).
Proof of Part (b)
Let µ θ it (·) be the restriction of µ it (·) to the event that the underlying state is θ. The belief update rule (1) can thus be rewritten as
where m θ it (s) = θ ∈Θ µ θ it (θ) θ i (s) is the probability that agent i assigns at time t to the event that she observes signal s in the next time period. Taking logarithms of both sides of the above equation and using Jensen's inequality imply
.
Multiplying both sides of the above inequality by v i and summing over i lead to
, and as a result,
By Proposition 1, agent i asymptotically learns the underlying state of the world θ, that is, m θ it (s) → θ i (s) as t → ∞ with P θ -probability one for all s. Hence, q θ t (θ) − p θ t (θ) → 0 with P θ -probability one, where
Taking the limit of both sides of inequality (10) as T → ∞ implies lim sup
Given that q θ t (θ) − p θ t (θ) converges to zero on P θ -almost all paths, the Cesàro means theorem implies that the first term on the right-hand side of the above inequality is equal to zero P θ -almost surely. 14 Furthermore, by the strong law of large numbers, the second term on the right-hand side is equal to
with P θ -probability one, where we are using the definition of h i (θ,θ).
Let e θ t denote the restriction of e t to the event that the underlying state is θ. By definition,
and as a result log e θ t ≥ log max
where in the last inequality we are using the fact that
P θ -almost surely, where the second inequality is a consequence of (11). Consequently, with P θ -probability one,
and hence,
P-almost surely.
Proof of Part (a)
The fact that λ ≤ r immediately implies that λ is finite with P-probability one.
Thus, we only need to show that the rate of learning λ is strictly positive. Define φ θ t : R n(|Θ|−1) → R n(|Θ|−1) as the mapping that maps (µ θ it−1 (θ)) i,θ =θ to (µ θ it (θ)) i,θ =θ . Also let
It is easy to verify that the block-diagonal matrix M θ t is the Jacobian of φ θ t evaluated at the origin. Thus, the linear dynamical system generated by {M θ t } t∈N is a linearization of the non-linear dynamical system {φ θ t } t∈N describing the evolution of the beliefs conditional on the realization of state θ. Finally, we let ζ θ be the top Lyapunov exponent (TLE) corresponding to the sequence of matrices
where the first inequality is a consequence of Jensen's inequality and the second is due to the fact that X 1 ≤ 1 X1 for any non-negative matrix X. Furthermore, given that E θ M θ 1 = A, the PerronFrobenius theorem implies that [E θ M θ 1 ] t → 1v as t → ∞ where v is the left eigenvector of A. Hence,
On the other hand, Assumption 1 guarantees that ρ(M θ t ) = 1 with P θ -positive probability, where ρ(X) denotes the spectral radius of matrix X. Thus, Theorem 2 of Kesten and Spitzer (1984) implies that ζ θ = 0, which completes the proof.
The above lemma thus shows that the linear dynamical system generated by {M θ t } t∈N is P θ -almost surely exponentially stable with exponent ζ θ . Next, we have the following lemma: Lemma 3. For all i and allθ = θ,
with P θ -probability one.
The above lemma, the proof of which is provided in Appendix D, follows from the fact that, under the condition of Lyapunov regularity, exponential stability of the linearization of a non-linear dynamical system guarantees that the original non-linear system is also exponentially stable with the same exponent. Lemma 3 implies that for P θ -almost all ω,
lim sup
Let M be the set of all probability measures on (N × S) × (N × S). Finally, with a slight abuse of notation, for any η ∈ M, let H(η) be the entropy of η defined as
17 Gharavi and Anantharam (2005) show that the solution to the optimization problem below is an upper bound on the TLE of the set of i.i.d. matrices {M θ t (θ)} t∈N when M θ t (θ) ∈ {Q k } k∈S and Q k is realized with probability p k . That is, ζ θ (θ) ≤ ξ θ (θ), where
subject to η
where Q k ij is the (i, j) element of Q k and F : M → R is defined as
with the usual convention that 0 log 0 = 0. Note that the diagonal elements of Q k are positive, whereas its off-diagonal elements are equal to the corresponding elements of A. Hence, Q k ji = 0 if and only if a ji = 0. Consequently, when solving for the optimal solution, we can let η kl ij = 0 whenever a ji = 0 and drop constraint (20) altogether. Given that maximizing (17) subject to (18) and (19) is a strictly convex problem, the first-order conditions characterize the unique optimal solution. Using Lagrange multipliers ρ kl and ν k i for the first and second set of constraints, the first-order condition with respect to η kl ij is
for i, j ∈ N and k, l ∈ S such that Q k ji = 0. Thus, any (η, ρ, ν) that solves (18), (19), and (21) simultaneously corresponds to an optimal solution.
In the case that θ i (·) = θ i (·) for all i, it is easy to verify that
satisfy optimality conditions (18), (19) and (21). Substitutingη in (17) then implies that ξ θ (θ) = 0.
If, on the other hand, the ratio
is close to one for all agents i and all signals, we can approximate ξ θ (θ) by its first-order Taylor expansion around the point
where we are using the fact that ξ θ (θ) evaluated at 
Proof of Proposition 3
Without loss of generality assume that agents are indexed such that v 1 ≥ v 2 ≥ · · · ≥ v n . Therefore, by assumption, h 1 (θ,θ) ≥ h 2 (θ,θ) ≥ · · · ≥ h n (θ,θ) for all θ,θ ∈ Θ. Also suppose that ( 1 , . . . , n ) is a reallocation of ( 1 , · · · , n ). Then, by the Hardy-Littlewood rearrangement inequality
for any given pair of states θ andθ. Therefore,
for all θ ∈ Θ, and as a result
completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4
We first state and prove a simple lemma. 19 The Hardy-Littlewood rearrangement inequality states that if x1 ≥ x2 ≥ · · · ≥ xn and y1 ≥ y2 ≥ · · · ≥ yn, then, for any permutation (y 1 , . . . , y n ) of (y1, . . . , yn), we have n i=1 xiyi ≥ n i=1 xiy i . For a reference, see, for example, Theorem 368 of Hardy, Littlewood, and Pólya (1952) .
Throughout the proof, without loss of generality, we assume that agents are indexed such that v 1 ≥ · · · ≥ v n . The assumption of the proposition thus guarantees that ε 1 ≤ · · · ≤ ε n .
Since E i = ∅,
is well-defined for all i. Furthermore, for any (ordered) pair of states (θ,θ) such that θ =θ, there exists some agent who is no worse than others in distinguishing between the two; or equivalently,
Now let γ = min i γ i and suppose that there exists a reallocation of signal structures with the corresponding rate of learning r such that r + (α/γ) max i ε i < r , which in view of (23) Note that the above inequality holds for all i only if v k ε k < v i ε i for all i. In particular, v k ε k < v i ε i for all i ∈ {k, . . . , n}.
Furthermore, recall that by assumption, v i ≤ v k for i ≥ k. Therefore, ε k < ε i for all i ∈ {k, . . . , n}.
This, however, leads to a contradiction. In particular, given that (ε 1 , . . . , ε n ) is a permutation of (ε 1 , . . . , ε n ) there are at most n − k indices j such that ε k < ε j . Thus, no reallocation of signals can increase the rate of learning by more than (α/γ) max i ε i .
Proof of Proposition 5
By assumption, the collection of signal structures ( 1 , . . . , n ) are comparable in the sense of uniform informativeness. Without loss of generality, assume that signal structures are indexed such that 1 · · · n , that is, h 1 (θ,θ) ≥ · · · ≥ h n (θ,θ) for all θ,θ ∈ Θ. Thus, by Proposition 3, the optimal rates of learning in social networks A and A are given by
respectively. On the other hand, given the assumption that A is more regular than A and by Lemma 1, we have,
which immediately implies r * ≤ r * .
Proof of Proposition 6
To simplify notation, we suppress the dependence on the size of the network n whenever there is no risk of confusion. Since E i = ∅, by Lemma 4,
Thus, by (23) where the second inequality is consequence of the fact that min i v i ≥ 1/(2n − 2). Hence, given any two sequences of social networks A n and A n , r n /r n ≤ 1/n + max i 1/γ i,n 1/(2n) max i ε i,n min i ε i,n ≤ 2c(1 + max i n/γ i,n ).
Assumption (c) of the proposition then immediately implies that there exists a uniform upper bound on the right-hand side of the above inequality for all n, and hence, lim sup n→∞ r n /r n < ∞. 
D Technical Appendix: Proof of Lemma 3
This technical appendix contains the proof of Lemma 3. The proof relies on the following theorem, which is a corollary to Theorems 1 and 2 of Barreira and Valls (2007) .
Theorem (Barreira and Valls) . Consider the dynamical system ϕ t (x) = P t x + f t (x) with trajectory x t ∈ R k , where P t ∈ R k×k for all t. Also, suppose that the following hold:
(a) The linear dynamical system generated by {P t } t∈N is Lyapunov regular.
(b) The TLE corresponding to {P t } t∈N is negative, that is, ς = lim t→∞ 1 t log P t P t−1 . . . P 1 < 0.
(c) f t (x) is a continuous map with f t (0) = 0 for all t.
(d) There are constants C, q > 0 such that f t (x) − f t (y) ≤ C x − y ( x q + y q ), for all t and all x, y ∈ R k . For all t 0 and > 0, there exist a neighborhood V of the origin and a constant K such that if x t0 ∈ V , then for all t ≥ t 0 , x t ≤ Ke (t−t0)(ς+ )+ t0 x t0 .
We use the above theorem to prove Lemma 3. Recall that φ θ t : R n(|Θ|−1) → R n(|Θ|−1) denotes the function that mapsμ θ t−1 = (µ θ it−1 (θ)) i,θ =θ toμ θ t = (µ θ it (θ)) i,θ =θ . Hence, the dynamical system {φ θ t } t∈N with trajectoryμ θ
